L.J. Johnson

The initiative and referendum

THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

AN EFFECTIVE ALLY OF REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

BY

LEWIS JEROME JOHNSON
Professor of Civil Engineering
Harvard University

ELEVENTH EDITION—REVISED

MASSACHUSETTS DIRECT LEGISLATION LEAGUE
LAWRENCE G. BROOKS, *Secretary*
53 State Street, Boston

APRIL, 1917

Price, Five Cents, Postpaid *Special Price in Quantities*

THE

Initiative and Referendum

AN EFFECTIVE ALLY

OF

REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT

OUR fathers founded this government in order to secure for the people—all the people—the blessings of life, liberty and happiness. They devised institutions and machinery to that end.

Today, after the lapse of a century and a quarter, combinations of power have grown up under these institutions in the face of which, for multitudes of our population, life is precarious, liberty practically despaired of, and happiness, except of a kind enjoyed by the Roman proletariat or the plantation slave, unknown. We know that no one would be more impatient of such conditions than our revolutionary forefathers, and no one more resolute in seeking a remedy. Honor to their memory requires us to scrutinize their work, and to modernize it if necessary, **just as they modernized their inherited institutions.**

Ideals of the Fathers Not at Fault

Accordingly we turn first to the spirit and purposes underlying our institutions. We find nothing to criticize, even after all this time. We can suggest no improvements in this quarter. Even now we are inspired with a new enthusiasm by the ideals expressed by our fathers in founding this republic, the ideals so impressively reaffirmed by Lincoln at Gettysburg.

Scrutiny of Their Governmental Machinery

We turn next to the details of their governmental machinery. Little is left of their industrial methods and institutions, and perhaps their political devices, too, are out of date.

If they are, possibly it is not too late to supplement them or replace them with better.

The legislative machinery underlies all else. We observe that our law-making is intrusted to representative bodies. The make-up of these bodies is, nominally at least, under public control, but the output (except amendments to state constitutions) is not even nominally under public control, except as such control may be exerted through pressure upon individual representatives. When we consider the extent to which such pressure is made effective today by the greedy and highly-organized few, rather than by the merely normally interested and unorganized many, a legislative system which may have been safe once comes to look decidedly defective.

A Fundamental Defect

Further reflection convinces us that this lack of adequate popular **control** is not only a defect, but is *the fundamental* defect in our legislative mechanism. Its correction is therefore essential, and is logically the first step in the modernization of our political machinery. This done, improved legislation is assured as fast as the majority can agree upon it. This done, all unnecessary and undesirable obstacles to progress will have been minimized. Until this is done, we have little reason to hope for permanently better conditions, except at an utterly unreasonable cost in effort and delay. The importance of concentrating attention upon this issue is manifest.

What Can Be Done

The next question is, How shall the public **get** adequate **control of legislation?**

The answer is, We must assert our natural right to revise the work of our representatives. We must do this revising ourselves. There is no one else to do it. To do it we must supplement the existing legislative machinery with a workable, orderly, and properly-guarded contrivance to enable us to enact laws, to veto them, to amend them or to repeal them by direct popular vote over the head of legislatures and

city councils, in the instances when these bodies fail to meet the public will.

Fortunately, the way to do this has been devised and tested and has met expectations on a city-wide and state-wide scale. It involves two devices developed in the last few decades, the Initiative and the Referendum, now included under the single term Direct Legislation.

Initiative and Referendum

The **Initiative** enables the people to enact desirable measures by direct popular vote, when such measures have been or are likely to be ignored, pigeonholed, amended out of shape, or defeated by the legislature. Measures passed in this way may be entirely new laws, or they may, of course, amend or repeal existing laws.

The **Referendum** enables the people, by direct popular vote, to veto recent enactments of their representatives.

The Initiative corrects sins of omission.

The Referendum corrects sins of commission.

The Initiative is set in operation by volunteer groups of citizens—civic, labor, or mercantile organizations—who draw up laws which they think good for themselves or the public, or perhaps both. If they can get a certain moderate percentage* of the voters of the city or state to sign the requisite petition, the measure goes to the council or legislature, and if this body refuses to adopt it within a specified time without amendment, the measure must be transmitted unchanged to the people for their decision. If the legislative body thinks it can produce a better enactment to the same effect, it may draw it up and send it to the people, with the other, as a competing measure. The voters then choose between them, or reject both. In some jurisdictions, notably Oregon, initiative measures go directly to the people without pre-

*The number of signatures required in these petitions ranges, in different states, from five to eight per cent of the voters for initiative petitions for ordinary laws; from eight to fifteen per cent for initiative petitions for constitutional amendments; and from five to ten per cent for referendum petitions. The usual percentages are eight for initiative and five for referendum petitions, though the tendency in the more populous states is wisely to reduce the former figure, and to turn to fixed numbers instead of percentages.

vious submission to the legislature. Other modifications in details may be expected with time.

The Referendum, likewise upon petition, brings newly passed legislation to the popular tribunal for veto or confirmation—and confirmation of some laws may be as important as the veto of others.

The need of interference with the work of the representatives is greatly reduced by the mere existence of the system, and the number of laws actually coming to popular vote is a small fraction of the whole.

The Recall and Its Relation to Direct Legislation

Direct Legislation is likely to result, before being long in operation, in the establishment of the Recall, which is the properly guarded power of removal of unsatisfactory officeholders before the expiration of their terms. Thus the people gain the power of removal, the logical supplement to their already existing power of election.

The Recall, though obviously a device indispensable for popular control, and usually, in city charters, established simultaneously with Direct Legislation, will not be discussed further here. It should be looked upon as one of the numerous desirable but subordinate measures, like Preferential Voting, Direct Nominations, the Short Ballot and Proportional Representation, which may safely be left to be gained by subsequent enactment in the larger jurisdictions like our states. This is strikingly true in Massachusetts, where the Recall has been suggested, if not actually authorized, in the Constitution since its adoption in 1780, as will be seen from Art. VIII of that Constitution quoted (p. 21), and could, possibly, unlike the Initiative and Referendum, be made operative without constitutional amendment.

Furnishing Information to Voters

The Initiative and Referendum, as now advocated, carry with them, of course, adequate and systematic means, independent of the newspapers, of furnishing each voter the full text of the measures to be voted on; the condensed form in which they will be printed on the ballot;

a statement of the reasons for and against each measure; and the names of those behind each proposition.

In Oregon, the Secretary of State edits this information and mails it in pamphlet form to each voter in the State fifty-five days before election. At least eight weeks have elapsed by that time since the circulation and filing of the petitions. This is found to afford ample time for deliberation and discussion, and the pamphlet provides an adequate basis for decisions. Those who wish to insert arguments in this pamphlet pay the cost of paper and printing—some eighty dollars per page—and the State bears the test of the cost of the pamphlet and its distribution. In initiative cases, supporting arguments are accepted from none but duly accredited representatives of the friends of the measure; anyone who will pay the cost, however, may insert arguments against such a measure. In referendum cases arguments upon either side may be inserted by anyone willing to pay the cost. In the election of November, 1916, when eleven measures were acted upon by the electorate, the State Pamphlet was a document of forty-eight octavo pages.

Oregon voters protect themselves still further from false or misleading campaign literature by a provision of their admirable Corrupt Practices Act—a comprehensive measure, based on English practice, which came from the people by the Initiative—which prescribes a heavy penalty for circulating political literature, unless it bears the names of its authors and publishers.

In Oklahoma, there is a State Pamphlet for informing voters as in Oregon, but with some interesting differences in detail. In Oklahoma, as is proposed in Massachusetts, initiative measures go first to the Legislature. Hence all popular voting is upon measures which have had recent legislative action. A joint committee of House and Senate is therefore naturally called upon to prepare the arguments supporting the Legislature's position. The opposing argument is drawn up by a committee representing the petitioners.

The argument for each side of each measure is restricted by the Oklahoma law to two thou-

sand words, one-fourth of which may be in answer to opponents' arguments. The direct argument on each side is prepared and submitted to the Secretary of State, who transmits it to the opposing side to serve as the basis for the rebuttal just mentioned and thus complete the argument. These arguments on all the questions are then assembled in the State Pamphlet and distributed to all the voters of the State a suitable number of weeks before the election. The cost of printing and distribution is borne by the public treasury.

The Oklahoma plan has some striking merits. It requires the Legislature to state the reason for the action which it has taken. Doubtless this reason is often good and sufficient, but perhaps more certainly so when the lawmakers know in advance that they may have to defend their positions. The Legislature's views on the measure should be of great value to the voters.

More important still, it insures the presentation of a negative argument. Experience in Oregon has already shown that a negative argument is not always forthcoming when left to be supplied by volunteers. A campaign of silence is sometimes wisely preferred by interests at whom an initiative measure is aimed, to the revelation of weakness which would result from a formal attempt at defense. They well know that voters are likely, from sheer force of habit, thoughtlessly to concede more in the defense of a long-established wrong than its beneficiaries would dare claim for it. The Oklahoma plan of informing voters requires each side to show its hand. Bluffing is eliminated. Privilege has to come out in the open and state such case as it has. Silent contempt is not permitted to do duty as argument.

Both the Oregon and the Oklahoma systems of disseminating information do much to forestall the misleading of voters through the newspapers. Some expense is involved, but this point is not apt to be pressed except by those opposed to the whole system on other grounds. The body of voters well understand that one bad law or one carelessly-granted franchise may cost the public in actual dollars and cents many times the cost of the State Pamphlet.

Hopeful Outlook for Representative Government

Supplemented by the Initiative and Referendum, to serve as a permanent background and for application when called for, the representative system should gradually but surely enter upon a period of honor and usefulness hitherto never surpassed and probably never equaled. Relieved of the unnatural excess of power under which they now stagger and sometimes fall, we may reasonably expect that legislative bodies will cease to be attractive objects for bribery and secret influence; that log-rolling will greatly diminish; that the power of bosses and rings will be undermined; and that seats in the legislatures will become unattractive to grafters and more attractive to high-minded, public-spirited citizens. There will be a fairer chance that a man clean when elected will stay clean. The party machines and bosses once permanently out of control, we may reach the point of competing successfully with the corporations in attracting the best young talent to the public service.

With Direct Legislation in vogue, it is not necessary to retire a faithful legislator to express disapproval of some of his measures. The electorate, while returning the man to office, can overrule the measures with no more reflection on his honor or usefulness than is involved in the overruling of a lower court by a higher.

Honest and able representatives are hence likely to be repeatedly re-elected. Long tenure is as valuable to public as to private business. Where the people have been in control long enough for this result to show, as in Switzerland and in the New England towns, they are seen to act upon this principle. In Switzerland it is rare that a new member appears in a legislative body except to fill a vacancy due to death or voluntary retirement. In New England towns it is common for faithful officials to be retained in office practically for life, their annual re-elections being frequently uncontested.

With a seat in the legislature thus robbed of its charms for all but the public-spirited, and with re-election practically assured to men of proved merit, real legislative experts in good number may gradually be developed.

Representative Government Yet to Be Given a Fair Trial

In view of such untested possibilities, it is beside the mark to wonder whether representative government is a failure. We begin to realize that it has not yet been fairly tried, at least not in recent years. We realize that our legislators have been working under almost intolerable conditions. They have been continually exposed to temptations that no ordinary man ought to be asked to face, and it is a tribute to human nature that so many of our legislators have stayed straight. Under Direct Legislation legislators will have all the power that is ever accorded to representatives and agents in business, which is all that is wholesome or attractive to worthy citizens of a democratic republic. That final enacting power is far from essential to the dignity of a legislative body is shown by the universal respect in which our American constitutional conventions have always been held.

Improved Status of the Voter

While enough power is thus left with the representatives, a salutary increase of responsibility is thrown upon the voter. It brings him, to some purpose, into closer touch with great affairs. It enables him to vote for measures apart from men, and for men apart from measures. He becomes a sovereign in fact as well as in fancy. He can settle something at an election besides the party label of officeholders, which in turn settles little except which faction shall dispense the spoils of office. For we know only too well that platforms are "merely to get in on, not to ride on." Even if they were expected to be observed, platforms are composites which rarely represent, except in the roughest way, the views of any one thoughtful voter.

Simplicity of the Voter's Task

The new task proposed for the voter, though inspiring, is relatively simple. It differs widely from legislation in the ordinary sense.

The originating and drafting of bills can manifestly never fall as a burden on the mass of the voters. For this service the community

can always command ability as wise, disinterested and as practised in legislation as any who now do such work. The average voter's part in the work is deliberation, discussion and the registry of his decision. This is no new task for him; the only novelty is in having a chance to do it intelligently, and to see his decision go into effect.

The voter, going into the booth, has known for months just what is coming up and in just what form it is coming up. There is no thought of possible amendment. With regard to each measure he has simply to approve or reject. He has had plenty of time to make up his mind. If a measure is objectionable in purpose or form, or is lacking in clearness, he will, of course, reject it and await—or cause—its reappearance in a more acceptable form at a subsequent election.

The voter is thus more like a juror than like a legislator. His capacity for intelligent, discriminating work at a single election is therefore large—much larger, as experience shows, than at first thought might seem possible.

In 1909, for example, the voters of Portland, Oregon, in a city election, besides voting for mayor and other officers, voted discriminatingly and with sustained interest on thirty-five measures, thirteen of which they passed. The average vote on each of the thirty-five measures was slightly over eighty-one per cent of the total vote for mayor, with a range from seventy-five per cent to ninety per cent. The majorities, both yes and no, were sometimes large, sometimes small. There is every evidence that the voting in each case reflected the calm judgment of the voters.

In Denver, in the election of May, 1910, the voters, besides electing city officers, dealt discriminatingly with a list of twenty-one measures, some of them trickily worded. Moreover, in this case, they had to face an enormous corruption fund and all that the combined party machines and selfish interests could do to mislead. The result was a triumph for the people at every significant point.

The people's capacity for Direct Legislation is not likely to be subjected to severer tests than it has already stood with signal success.

New Talent Freely Enlisted for Public Service

Through Direct Legislation, the State will offer an attractive field of usefulness for such of her citizens as do not care to give up their whole time to public life. Public-spirited citizens, without dislocation of business or profession, may reasonably devote a much larger share of their time than now to the consideration of public questions. If they conceive of a desirable step in legislation, they will not have to contrive to get into office and to stay there long enough to accomplish their ends. They have a dignified and honorable method of presenting to the final authority, for adoption or rejection, the best fruits of their labors, free from the risk of mutilation or distortion by ill-informed, overworked, or corrupt legislatures. This alone would be a powerful means of bringing spontaneously to the public service, and at no public expense, a large amount of talent of the best possible sort for which there is now little encouragement in public life. This is the talent on which we might well depend for the most serious lawmaking, but which we have had, thus far, too little chance to utilize. The legislature will thus be facing a reasonable and wholesome competition and the public cannot fail to profit thereby.

Direct Legislation a Safeguard against Mob Rule

Sometimes officeholders or party machine men profess a great fear that Direct Legislation will result in "mob rule." This must be taken to mean that they fear, probably with reason, that the people, after weeks of deliberation and with adequate information, would not support their pet schemes. Prospective abundance of popular majorities in their favor would neither excite their protests nor be called by them "mob rule." No; mob-action finds a more promising field in nominating conventions, and even town meetings than in the long process of gathering signatures, weeks of discussion and deliberation, and the quiet vote on an Australian ballot in isolated, individual booths.

Direct Legislation is not only a safeguard against mob rule, but against the only thing

likely with us to lead to violent revolution, namely, machine rule for the benefit of the privileged few. Direct Legislation precludes both mob rule and machine rule, for it brings into play the great patient mass of honest, hard-working citizens, ordinarily silent and little felt. They abhor alike the violent methods of the mob and the intriguing of "politics." No less do they shrink from making themselves individually conspicuous in hopelessly protesting against intrenched wrongs which they can, though they ought not to, endure. They are likely to suffer in silence until driven to extremes, rather than seek relief through the distasteful and inadequate means now at their disposal.

The adoption of an additional and more accurate means of expressing the deliberate public will, with the certainty that the verdict thus expressed will take effect, is the logical way to insure the healthy and natural progress which in the long run is the only preventive of violent upheaval.

Deeper Value of Direct Legislation

An additional advantage in Direct Legislation is the education which it affords the average voter. One cannot help believing that the consequent toning-up of the public standard of thought and morals would be in the long run the most important feature of the system. Direct Legislation tends thus automatically to produce a highly-trained and self-respecting electorate, and to lay the deepest and most promising foundation for permanent good government.

Direct Legislation is the only orderly means known for accurately and unmistakably expressing the public will as to legislation, and for making it prevail. It gives at last a fair approach to a proper and worthy means of registering public sentiment, well defined by someone as "the deliberate and reasoned judgment" of the people. It is as effective a balance wheel against mere popular clamor as it is a safeguard against the silent scheming of the crafty few. Direct Legislation thus opens for the first time a fair prospect for the early realization of the cherished American ideal—a government by as well as of and for the people.

Development of Direct Legislation

The Direct Legislation idea is no novelty among free peoples. It may be seen in the institutions of the Plymouth Colony. It appears in our time-honored New England town meeting and the even more ancient Swiss Landesgemeinde, and German folk-moot, all of them perfect exemplifications of the Direct Legislation principle on a small scale. It appears in our popular ratification of state constitutions and their amendments, usually insisted upon from the first, in spite of the pitifully inadequate facilities of our early days.

More recently, we note the steady extension of Direct Legislation through the Initiative and Referendum from canton to canton in Switzerland, its application to Swiss federal legislation —the Referendum in 1874 and the Initiative for constitutional amendments in 1891—and its adoption in the last decade by city after city and State after State in this country. Direct Legislation (usually accompanied from the start by the Recall) is an essential feature of nearly all modern city charters, and those without it will doubtless have to add it sooner or later to get satisfactory results. Notable among the Direct Legislation cities stand Los Angeles, Denver, Cleveland and St. Louis, besides scores of the so-called commission-governed cities, such as Des Moines, Spokane and Grand Junction, Col. The Direct Legislation states are South Dakota, Oregon, Montana, Oklahoma, Maine, Missouri, Arkansas, Colorado, Arizona, California, Ohio, Nebraska, Nevada, Washington, Michigan, North Dakota and Mississippi.

The vote by which each state adopted these measures, with the date, is as follows:

State	Year	Yes	No
South Dakota	1898	23,816	16,483
Utah	1900	19,219	7,786
Oregon	1902	62,024	5,668
Nevada (Referendum only)	1905	4,393	792
Montana	1906	36,374	6,616
Oklahoma*	1907	180,333	73,059
Maine	1908	53,785	24,543
Missouri	1908	177,615	147,290
Arkansas	1910	91,363	39,680
Colorado	1910	89,141	28,698
Arizona*	1911	12,187	3,822

*Vote on state constitution.

State	Year	Yes	No
California	1911	168,744	52,093
New Mexico* (Ref. only)	1911	31,724	13,399
Ohio	1912	312,592	231,312
Idaho (Init.)	1912	38,918	15,195
Idaho (Ref.)	1912	43,658	13,490
Nebraska	1912	189,200	15,315
Nevada (Initiative)	1912	9,956	1,027
Washington	1912	110,110	43,905
Michigan (Const. Init.)	1913	204,796	162,392
Michigan (Legis. I. & R.)	1913	219,057	152,388
North Dakota (Const. Init.)	1914	43,111	21.815
North Dakota (Legis. I. & R.)	1914	48,783	19,964
Mississippi,	1914	19,118	8,718
Maryland (Ref. only)	1915	33,150	10,022

Until the autumn of 1912, the Initiative and Referendum had been adopted by every American state in which they had come to popular vote. Since then these measures have received favorable popular majorities in Wyoming and Minnesota ranging from two to one to six to one, but they failed of adoption because the affirmative vote fell below a majority of all the votes cast at the election (see Joker No. 2, pp. 23-25).

In 1914, Texas rejected a worthless measure, unworthy of support by discerning friends of a workable law, nevertheless the sentiment in favor of the principle was so strong that the majority against it was only 4,613 in a total of 128,945 votes. In Wisconsin, in the same year, a fairly good measure went down under the wave of reaction which swamped every one of the ten constitutional amendments which the legislature of that state submitted that year. Even then it got distinctly the largest vote of all these measures but one—an amendment for home rule for cities.

No open effort to secure the repeal of the Initiative and Referendum has been attempted in any state where they have once been adopted. Proposals, plausible in appearance, but really a menace to these measures or even destructive of their practical value, were before the voters of Oregon in 1910 and 1912, in Missouri in 1914, and in Washington in 1916. In each case they were overwhelmingly rejected. In 1916 Arizona rejected an attempt to enact Joker No. 2 (see pp. 23-25).

It should be stated that in some of these

*Vote on state constitution.

states the measures are largely or quite inoperative through excessive restrictions, as in South Dakota and Montana, or through failure of the legislature to provide the requisite detailed legislation carelessly left to it in the amendment, as in Utah and Idaho. For this reason these two states were not named in the first list on the opposite page.

The people of Illinois passed advisory votes in favor of the Initiative and Referendum by 428,469 to 87,654 in 1902, and re-affirmed this verdict by 447,908 to 128,398 in 1910. In spite of this, their legislature has thus far failed to respond with the desired legislation.

How It Works in Switzerland

For examples of the effect of Direct Legislation, we naturally turn first to Switzerland, where it has been in operation on what may be called a large scale for thirty to fifty years. With the aid of Direct Legislation, as a result of its moral influence as well as by its direct application, Switzerland has, **wherever she has applied it,** rid herself of the misrule and exploitation which were previously rampant, as they had been for centuries, in all but the minute but ultra-democratic cantons.* Thanks to sound democratic idealism supported by suitable machinery for its expression, she has now come to be an admirably governed country.

Mr. James Bryce, recently British ambassador to the United States, declared to a Cambridge audience in 1904 that Switzerland is the most successful democracy that the world has ever seen.

Further expert testimony to what is generally known and admitted by the well-informed and disinterested is hardly needed, but the New International Encyclopedia in its article on Switzerland, expresses it so naively that it may be worth citing. After a lengthy account of the civil wars and political turmoil in the early part of the nineteenth century, it disposes of

*It is to these little cantons, including less than ten per cent of the area, and less than seven per cent of the population of the present whole country, that Switzerland owes her otherwise quite undeserved reputation for century-old, free, political institutions.

the rest of the century with the single remark that "the history of Switzerland for the past quarter of a century has been very uneventful, though marked by a steady material, intellectual and political growth."

All this does not mean that Switzerland is an unalloyed paradise. Some of the great human problems seem as far from solution in Switzerland as elsewhere. It does mean that the government promptly reflects public sentiment, and at the same time is free from violent fluctuations of policy. It means that the government is administered efficiently, and in the interest of the public good. It means that Switzerland, with a form of government modeled largely upon our own, by a modification which might have been suggested by our Declaration of Independence, has secured good government in a democratic republic.

Old-Fashioned Methods Survive in One Canton

The excellent results in Switzerland are to be seen not only in her federal affairs, but also in the affairs of an overwhelming majority of her cantons. We must not, however, overlook Canton Fribourg, the only one of the twenty-two Swiss cantons as yet unable to equip herself with the Initiative and Referendum. She has still the unperfected or "pure" representative system characteristic of our American states and cities and of the old times in the rest of Switzerland. This brings with it, there as here, boss-rule and all that boss-rule implies. The legislative body is nominated by the boss, elected by the people and managed by the boss. Prominent citizens are skilfully kept in line by a share in the plunder for themselves, or for their churches or philanthropies, or by fear of loss of favor with the two chief banks, both creatures of the boss. There is bribery, extravagance, subordination of the general interest to private business, the heaviest per capita cantonal debt in Switzerland, and the public apathy which naturally follows widespread hopelessness. The agitation for the Initiative and Referendum is still kept up by Fribourg patriots as their only hope, but all orderly means of success are in

the control of the boss who, of course, fights them and will fight them for his political life.*

Initiative and Referendum Most Developed in Important Centers

As a contrast to Fribourg, it should be observed that the chief cantons of Switzerland, Berne and Zurich, the former a farming, the latter a manufacturing canton, both far in the lead of their neighbors in population and importance, are among the cantons having the Initiative and Referendum in their most radical and readily workable form. Zurich is clearly the most advanced of the cantons in this respect, and Berne is surpassed, and at that only slightly, by few besides Zurich.

In short, where the Initiative and Referendum are most readily set in motion, there have developed clean government and leadership in civic and industrial growth. In the only canton where there is neither the Initiative and Referendum nor pure democracy, there is misrule and political apathy of the familiar American type.

Switzerland an Adequate Precedent for American States and Cities

The Swiss success under perfected representative government may reasonably be expected to be repeated in this country, for the strength of the system lies in giving common human nature a fair chance to do itself justice. Human nature in Switzerland is very much like that elsewhere. That it is like that in this country is to be seen from the fact that representative government without direct popular control results in demoralization and bad government there just as it does here, and in just the same way there as it does here.

It is sometimes suggested, however, that little Switzerland, good as her results are conceded to be, is not an adequate precedent for an

*This bit of evidence from Fribourg is drawn from an article entitled "The Only Political Boss in Switzerland," by Judson King, now Secretary of the National Popular Government League, in the *Twentieth Century Magazine* for July, 1910. The article is based on his personal observations in Canton Fribourg.

immense nation like the United States. But a small nation may exemplify a principle essential to the success of a large nation. An ocean liner must obey the laws of steam-engineering as well as a tug-boat. A sound fundamental principle holds regardless of the scale of the enterprise. That a self-governing people must have effective control over the laws under which they live would seem to be a principle of this kind. Details may require adjustment, but the principle will hold. But all that aside, the important comparison is not so much with our nation as with our cities and states. Switzerland, unhomogeneous in population, pre-eminently a manufacturing nation, larger than Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut combined, with a population slightly larger than that of Massachusetts, is plainly an excellent precedent for the adoption of Direct Legislation by individual American cities and states.

Moreover, there may never be need for a federal Initiative and Referendum system for this country. With the rings once permanently ousted from our cities and states, the federal government should automatically run clear. For the rings that do the plundering at Washington could manifestly not long survive without their intrenchments in the cities and states. At any rate, it is obviously correct tactics now to go right ahead for the Initiative and Referendum in states and cities. Our only disappointments with it, judging by experience elsewhere, are likely to arise from excessive restrictions which the legislatures may impose upon it.

New England States Especially Fitted for Direct Legislation

New England, the home of the town meeting, enjoying the inspiration of the Massachusetts and other New England States constitutions, with Maine already in the Direct Legislation ranks, may be expected to take especially kindly to this new and long step toward the realization of her ancient ideals.

The real questions for us in New England to answer are:

1. Are we **now** as fit for this forward step as

the Swiss were when they were putting the system in operation thirty to fifty years ago?

2. Is not even a complicated law, properly explained and vouched for, as suitable a thing for a popular vote as a choice between complicated candidates whose actions no one can foresee?

3. Is not an occasional vote on an ordinary law a natural and reasonable addition to our time-honored system of popular votes on state constitutions and their amendments?

4. Is it not worth while to disentangle measures from men and submit to popular vote definite and distinct propositions instead of mixtures of candidates, parties and platforms?

Encouragement from Oregon

To ask these questions in America is to answer them in the affirmative. All parts of the country are coming to see the point. Oregon, nearly half as large again as all New England combined, has set an encouraging example.

In 1902 she adopted Direct Legislation. She was then deep in political corruption. Thanks to the Initiative, and measures secured with it which legislatures had refused to pass, she has made great progress toward better government. The number of measures on the Oregon ballot at one time rose to thirty-seven, but in 1916 the number had dropped to eleven—an indication that the Legislature is learning to do better work.

The outeries of the local plunderers show that they feel their power slipping away. Their intrigues for the destruction of the Initiative and Referendum show that they know the cause.

What the Fathers Were Trying To Do

We shall be interested to see how Direct Legislation fits in with the ideas of our wonderfully far-sighted and successful constitution framers. It will be worth while to quote a few passages from the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts—the oldest of their works—the spirit of which is no stranger in other parts of the country. Articles V, VII, and VIII of that honored document will give ideas of the fathers on the relation of the people to their representatives:

Art. V. All power residing originally in the people, and being derived from them, the several magistrates and

officers of government, vested with authority, whether legislative, executive, or judicial, are their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable to them.

Art. VII. Government is instituted for the common good; for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people; and not for the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of men: Therefore the people have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government; and to reform, alter or totally change the same, when their protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness require it.

Art. VIII. In order to prevent those who are vested with authority from becoming oppressors, the people have a right, at such periods and in such manner as they shall establish by their frame of government, to cause their public officers to return to private life; and to fill up vacant places by certain and regular elections and appointments.

Lack of Steam and Electricity the Obstacle to Direct Legislation at the Outset

On reading these sturdy New England doctrines one must conclude that the only reason why the fathers did not then and there establish Direct Legislation for the State and for cities as they might develop, was that it was at that time physically impossible. Mechanical invention had not advanced far enough to permit it even if they had conceived the idea. We must not forget that their facilities for disseminating information and gathering returns were little superior to those of Julius Cæsar. They knew no more of railways than Cæsar did, such highways as they had were not so good as Cæsar's. But they resolutely did all that was practicable under the mechanical conditions of their time. They provided an obligatory referendum on the adoption and amendment of the Constitution of the Commonwealth, even though it might and did take weeks to put the matter to vote and get the returns. And it is clear that nothing was farther from their minds than that the will of representatives should prevail over the will of the people, some modern officeholders to the contrary notwithstanding.

Now that Direct Legislation, as a working institution on a large scale, has become a possibility through the introduction of the modern means of spreading news and ideas by the telegraph, high-speed printing press, and the railway, we can proceed from the point where the fathers

were forced to stop and can vindicate more clearly than ever the soundness of their noble idealism.

An Attractive Outlook

In closing, it may be said that the Initiative and Referendum appeal particularly to progressive Americans in whom still lives the spirit of the liberty-loving men who founded this nation. Such citizens readily comprehend the necessity of controlling the important **results,** and of not limiting themselves to toying at government while privilege does the governing. They take great satisfaction, moreover, in a remedial measure so thoroughly in harmony with the old ideals and institutions. It involves, after all, only a bit of additional machinery, and depends for its success only upon our fitness for self-government.

Of course Direct Legislation is only a piece of mechanism. It will not suffice merely to set it up. It must be made to work promptly and with vigor when required. This will take real citizens. Oregon shows that such citizens still exist—some of them of New England or other American stock, some of them born in old-world monarchies.

The success in Switzerland, the steady progress and gratifying results in America, the strenuous opposition by favorites or managers of political machines, the misrepresentations by professional lobbyists and conspicuous office-holders, echoed in editorials in their newspapers, all indicate that the Initiative and Referendum are measures justly destined to receive an increasing amount of public attention and regard.

With the Initiative and Referendum in force, we shall be equipped as never before to resist enemies from within; enemies far more dangerous to our freedom than any foreign foe.

The Initiative and Referendum may well be the means of instituting on a permanent basis the responsible kind of representative government which our fathers lived and died to secure.

The Initiative and Referendum may well prove to be the salvation of the momentous experiment led by Jefferson, Hancock, Franklin, the Adamses and Washington.

APPENDIX I

Dangerous Jokers*

Now that the demand for the Initiative and Referendum is becoming irresistible, the public must be on guard against the subtle dangers peculiar to this stage of the movement. The opposition may now seem to yield while actually conniving at the enactment of an unworkable sham, which may be worse than useless—for popular disappointment in the working of mere half-way measures, adopted in the name of reform, is a most potent ally of civic apathy and reaction.

A favorite way of producing a sham measure is by inserting or manipulating a few words so as to produce one of the seven jokers described below. The public is induced to swallow them by smooth talk about "safeguarding" the Initiative and Referendum or "protecting" it from "abuse." The uniform result is violation of the people's right to effective supremacy in legislation, and a new lease of life for invisible government.

Joker No. 1. *Restricting the Initiative to statute laws, and thus withholding from the voters power to adopt amendments to the state constitution over the head of the legislature.*

Obviously, since the constitution is the fundamental law, the Constitutional Initiative is the vitally important feature of Direct Legislation. Some of the most prolific sources of social unrest are constitutional provisions whose repeal legislatures will not permit. Fortunately, only six of the states rated as Initiative and Referendum states are without the Constitutional Initiative, *viz.*: South Dakota, Utah, Montana, Maine, Washington and Idaho.

Joker No. 2. *The requirement of an impossible or too difficult majority for enactment or rejection of a measure by the people.*

---

*These jokers were first categorically exposed in *Equity* of January, 1913, from which Appendix I is to some extent taken. Additional on these jokers can be obtained from the National Popular Government League, Judson King, Secretary, 637 Munsey Bldg., Washington, D. C. Mr. King's help in the preparation of Appendix I is gratefully acknowledged.

This joker takes the form of an innocent-looking stipulation that the majority required for enactment of an Initiative measure or rejection of a Referendum measure shall be a majority "of all the votes cast *at the election*," or "of *all registered voters*." Either is practically fatal to the usefulness of the measure. In practice this joker is tantamount to requiring a two-thirds to even a five-sixths or even heavier majority of the voters (who vote) to overrule the legislature.

Stripped of all pretense, Joker No. 2 is a requirement that those nominal voters who are too ignorant or indifferent to vote one way or the other on a measure shall always be counted as having voted *against* an Initiative measure and *for* a Referendum measure, *i.e.*, shall be counted so as to maintain the supremacy of the legislature and over-ride a majority of the thinking, voting portion of the electorate.

Joker No. 2 should meet particularly short shrift in Massachusetts where, for a century and a third, constitutional amendments have always been accepted or rejected by the majority of those voting on each. Since the adoption of the original constitution in 1780, Massachusetts has never used the combined Don't Knows and Don't Cares as a ready-made avalanche with which to overwhelm the majority of voters who vote, except in the case of the Public Opinion Law noted below.

This joker met a deserved and picturesque fate in 1912, where the reactionaries tried to slip it into the Oregon system. Two of the measures on the ballot were for this purpose: one submitted by the Legislature, one by Initiative petition—fathered by a "Majority (!) Rule League." The scorn for both measures was such, in that experienced community, that the negative vote in their two-to-one rejection actually did roll up to the very unusual figure of more than the very majority which the joker itself was intended to establish.

Only three of the forty-one amendments to the Constitution of Massachusetts now in force got an affirmative vote as great as a majority of the votes cast in the same election for governor. One of these was adopted in 1833 by a vote of

32,354 to 3,272, while the total vote for governor was 62,474. Under Joker No. 2, if there had been 1,200 fewer "yes" votes, the amendment would have been lost, though favored by a nearly ten-to-one vote of those who voted on the measure.

The affirmative votes in 1820, 1852 and 1916 authorizing constitutional conventions, were in each case less than a majority of the total vote cast for governor at the same election; in 1820 less than one-fourth of that vote. Yet the affirmative votes of 1820 and 1852 are officially described as a "majority of the people"; that of 1820 as "a large majority of the people,"—for it was nearly a two-to-one vote of those voting on the measure.

The Massachusetts legislatures of 1912 and 1913, in passing what is now in force as the Forty-second Article of Amendment, reaffirmed the Massachusetts tradition of what constitutes a properly defined majority by providing that measures submitted under it to the people shall become law if approved "by a majority of the voters voting thereon."

The so-called Public Opinion Law (chapter 819, Acts of 1913), a measure to which one of these legislatures was apparently less cordial, set the hampering requirement of "a majority of all the votes cast at the election." The forty-second amendment they wanted actually to work; it relieved them of responsibility. The Public Opinion Law they were evidently not so particular about having workable.

The proper, fair, and usual requirement is that any measure shall be decided by a majority of the votes cast **thereon;** to depart from this practice would be to impair radically and almost fatally the usefulness of the Initiative and Referendum, besides departing from a time-honored Massachusetts practice.

Joker No. 3. *The requirement of an unreasonably large number of signers or other burdensome restrictions upon petitions.*

Clearly if the labor of filing a petition is too great, the Initiative and Referendum is useless. In Massachusetts where, for generations, ten

voters have had the power to work the Initiative in town affairs by putting in the town warrant a measure which can be settled only by vote of the whole town, the requirement of 10,000 to 30,000 signers for state petitions of similar purport seems quite high enough.

Besides calling for too many signers, there may be a burdensome and illogical stipulation that the signers shall come in certain arbitrary proportions from various parts of the state. This may become an absurd infraction of equal rights,—a voter is a voter regardless of where in the state he lives, and no one, strictly speaking, should be discriminated against because he lives in one county or another. A provision of this sort may arise from an honest desire to prevent the ballot from being overburdened with measures concerning only a single large city. There should be the same desire to keep such measures out of the state legislature. The whole difficulty can best be met by suitable home-rule provisions; but pending the adoption of a proper home-rule amendment, a moderate distribution requirement may be desirable, if it is clear that it does not make the petition requirements too difficult to meet.

Other pettier but equally dangerous restrictions are likely to appear, but they should not deceive any who really intend that the Initiative and Referendum shall *work*.

Joker No. 4. *Framing the "emergency clause" so that the legislature can too readily annul the Referendum.*

Exemption of measures from the Referendum is unquestionably desirable in occasional emergencies, but great care must be taken that none but *bona fide* emergencies are called such. A two-thirds yea and nay vote by the members of each house upon a separate section, declaring the emergency to exist and setting forth the reasons for emergency action, should be required for establishing an "emergency." The granting of franchises as "emergency measures" should be specifically prohibited.

An inadequately-guarded emergency clause can be a large hole through the Referendum.

Joker No. 5. *Putting an arbitrary limit on the number of measures which can be submitted to the people at any one election.*

This is an old scheme which has worked great hardships. Of course it is an invitation to fill up the ballot promptly with trivial proposals, and thus keep measures of importance waiting indefinitely. Subservient legislatures, particularly in Illinois, have made much of such chances.

Joker No 6. *Failing to provide an adequate and efficient means of informing voters regarding the measures submitted to them.*

The only safety for predatory interests is to keep the voters in ignorance or misinformed. The only safety for the state is the opposite. Newspapers of course do not meet the need. A state publicity pamphlet combining the best features of the Oregon and Oklahoma pamphlets must be insisted on. The lack of such a thing is a weak point in the traditional Massachusetts practice in referenda on constitutional amendments. This and their frequently uninteresting character will doubtless explain the slight attention they sometimes get from the voters.

Joker No. 7. *Providing that certain matters may not be made the subject of Initiative and Referendum petitions.*

The opponents of an Initiative and Referendum measure often try to weaken or destroy its effectiveness by excluding from its operation certain matters with which they do not wish the people to deal.

Local matters and matters of little general interest, if such can be clearly defined, might well be excluded from the general Initiative and Referendum, but the people as a whole should have power to deal with all matters of general interest and importance. This is the essence of the Initiative and Referendum.

Other methods of producing an honest-looking sham measure can doubtless be devised, notably by ambiguous or incomplete wording, but it is believed that the foregoing indicates the most subtle and serious dangers thus far brought to light.

APPENDIX II

The precise terms of an enactment which may be considered best suited to establish the Initiative and Referendum in Massachusetts, can be seen in the proposed amendment given below in full. This measure was drawn up in 1916 by the Union for a Progressive Constitution, and the Massachusetts advocates of the Initiative and Referendum are believed to be a unit in its support. This amendment, framed particularly to fit Massachusetts methods and traditions, may properly be called the Massachusetts Plan. It is intended to secure deliberate but effective popular control in legislation, with a minimum of disturbance of inherited methods, a minimum cumbering of the ballot, and a maximum of co-operation by the Legislature in the discussion and perfection of Initiative measures. Its provision for friendly amendments of such measures is an important and significant feature in the Massachusetts Plan.

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS ESTABLISHING THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM

DEFINITION

Legislative power shall continue to be vested in the General Court, subject to the provisions of the Constitution; but the people reserve to themselves the Initiative, which is the power of a certain number of voters to submit laws and amendments to the constitution to the people for enactment, adoption or rejection at the polls; and the Referendum, which is the power of a certain number of voters to submit laws, or any part thereof, enacted by the General Court, to the people for their ratification or rejection at the polls. The power of Initiative and Referendum shall be exercised as hereinafter provided.

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION

If an Initiative petition for any specific and particular amendment to the Constitution is introduced into the General Court, in the manner hereinafter provided, signed by not less than twenty-five thousand qualified voters of the Commonwealth, and the General Court into which it is introduced shall fail to agree to such amendment in the manner provided in the ninth article of amendment to the Constitution, such amendment shall, nevertheless, be deemed to be referred to the next General Court, and shall have the same standing therein as if once agreed to; and if such next General Court shall fail before the first Wednesday of July to agree to such amendment in the manner provided in such ninth article, and if such Initiative petition is completed by filing with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, not earlier than the first Wednesday of the following August nor later than the first Wednesday of the following September, not less than five thousand additional signatures of such qualified voters, then the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall submit such proposed amendment

to the people at the next state election; and if it shall be approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon, such amendment shall become part of the Constitution of this Commonwealth.

LAWS

If an Initiative petition for a law is introduced into the General Court in the manner hereinafter provided, signed by not less than fifteen thousand qualified voters of the Commonwealth, and the General Court into which it is introduced fails to enact such law before the first Wednesday of July; and if such Initiative petition is completed by filing with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, not earlier than the first Wednesday of the following August nor later than the first Wednesday of the following September, not less than five thousand additional signatures of such qualified voters, then the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall submit such proposed law to the people at the next state election; and if it shall be approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon, such proposed law shall, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, become law, and shall take effect in thirty days after such state election, or at such time after such election as may be provided in such law.

INITIATIVE PETITION

An Initiative petition shall set forth the full text of the proposed constitutional amendment or law which is the subject of the petition. Such petition shall first be signed by ten qualified voters of the Commonwealth, and shall then be filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, who shall provide blanks for the use of subsequent signers. He shall print at the top of each blank a description of the proposed constitutional amendment or law and the names and addresses of the first ten signers. All Initiative petitions for a law or an amendment to the Constitution, with the first ten signatures attached, shall be filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth not earlier than the first Wednesday of the September before the assembling of the General Court into which it is to be introduced, and the remainder of the required signatures shall be filed not later than the first Wednesday of the following December.

If an Initiative petition, signed by the required number of qualified voters, has been filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth as aforesaid, he shall, upon the assembling of the General Court, transmit such petition to the clerk of the House of Representatives, and the proposed constitutional amendment or law which is the subject of such petition shall then be deemed to be introduced into that General Court and pending in the House of Representatives.

EXCLUDED MATTERS

No law, the operation of which is restricted to a town, city, or other political subdivision of the Commonwealth, shall be the subject of such Initiative petition.

PERFECTING AMENDMENTS

If the General Court fails to agree to a constitutional amendment or law as aforesaid, the first ten signers of the Initiative petition therefor, or a majority of them, shall have the right, subject to protest filed as hereinafter provided, to amend the proposed constitutional amendment or law which is the subject of such petition. An amendment so made shall not invalidate any signature attached to the petition. If the constitutional amendment or law so amended, signed by such first ten signers or a majority of them, is filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth before the second Wednesday of July, and if no protest against such amendment, signed by not less than one hundred other signers of such petition, is filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth before the first Wednesday of the following August, then the Secretary of the Com-

monwealth shall submit to the people the constitutional amendment or law in its amended form; in case of such protest he shall submit it in its original form.

REFERENDUM

No law passed by the General Court shall take effect earlier than ninety days after final enactment, excepting laws declared to be emergency measures and laws which may not be made the subject of a Referendum petition, as hereinafter provided.

EMERGENCY MEASURES

A law declared to be an emergency measure shall contain a preamble setting forth the facts constituting the emergency, and shall contain the statement that such law is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, safety, or convenience. A separate vote shall be taken on the preamble of such law by a call of the yeas and nays, which shall be recorded, and unless the preamble is adopted by two-thirds of the Senators and two-thirds of the members of the House of Representatives present and voting thereon, the law shall not be an emergency measure; provided, that no grant of any franchise or amendment thereof, or renewal or extension thereof for more than one year, shall be declared to be an emergency measure.

SUBMISSION UPON REFERENDUM

In case of any law enacted by the General Court which is not an emergency measure as above defined, if, within ninety days after its final enactment, a petition is filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth signed by not less than fifteen thousand qualified voters of the Commonwealth, asking for a Referendum on such law or any part thereof, and requesting that the operation of such law be suspended, then the operation of such law shall be suspended, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall submit such law or part thereof to the people at the next state election, if thirty days intervene between the date when such petition is filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the date for holding such state election; if thirty days do not so intervene, then such law or part thereof shall be submitted to the people at the next following state election, unless in the meantime such law or part thereof shall have been repealed; and if such law or part thereof shall be approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon, such law or part thereof shall, subject to the provisions of the Constitution, take effect in thirty days after such election, or at such time after such election as may be provided in such law; if not so approved, such law or part thereof shall be null and void.

In case of an emergency measure or of a law which takes effect because the Referendum petition does not contain a request for suspension, as aforesaid, if, within ninety days after its final enactment, a petition is filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth, signed by not less than ten thousand qualified voters of the Commonwealth, protesting against such law or any part thereof and asking for a Referendum thereon, then the Secretar of the Commonwealth shall submit such law or part thereof to the people at the next state election, if thirty days intervene between the date when such petition is filed with the Secretary of the Commonwealth and the date for holding such state election; if thirty days do not so intervene, then such law or part thereof shall be submitted to the people at the next following state election, unless in the meantime such law or part thereof shall have been repealed; and if such law or part thereof shall not be approved by a majority of the qualified voters voting thereon, such law or part thereof shall, at the expiration of thirty days after such election, be thereby repealed.

EXCLUDED MATTERS

No law, appropriating money for the current or ordinary expenses of the Commonwealth, or of any of its departments, boards, commissions, or institutions, and no law, the operation of which is restricted to a town, city, or other political subdivision of the Commonwealth, shall be the subject of such Referendum petition.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Provision for the proper collection and certification of signatures to the petitions hereinbefore referred to, and for penalties for the forgery of signatures thereto, may be made by law.

Not more than twenty-five per cent of the certified signatures on any petition shall be those of registered voters of any one county.

Each proposed amendment to the Constitution, and each law submitted to the people, shall be described on the ballots by a description to be determined by the Secretary of the Commonwealth, subject to such provision as may be made by law, and the Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause each question to be printed on the ballot in accordance with the following provisions:

In the case of an amendment to the Constitution: Shall an amendment to the Constitution [here insert description] be approved?

Yes	
No	

In the case of a law: Shall a law [here insert description] be approved?

Yes	
No	

The Secretary of the Commonwealth shall cause to be printed and sent to each voter the full text of every measure to be submitted to the people, together with the description thereof as it will appear on the ballot; and shall in such manner as may be provided by law, cause to be prepared and sent to the voters information and arguments thereon.

The veto power of the governor shall not extend to measures approved by the people.

For readers wishing a fuller discussion of the Initiative and Referendum, it may be proper to refer to some of the most recent larger works upon the subject:

The Initiative, Referendum and Recall. Edited by William Bennett Munro. Appleton, 1912. 356 *pp.*

A collection of fifteen essays on different sides of the question by as many different authors, including one by the editor.

Government by All the People, or the Initiative, Referendum and the Recall as Instruments of Democracy. By Delos F. Wilcox, Ph.D. Macmillan, 1912. 324 *pp.*

The most recent monograph on the subject. Arguments pro and con are fully and readably considered. The verdict is favorable to the measures. The full text of the Ohio Initiative and Referendum amendment, adopted September 3, 1912, is given.

Documents on the State-wide Initiative, Referendum and Recall. By Charles A. Beard and Birl E. Schultz. Macmillan, 1912. 394 *pp.*

A collection of all Initiative and Referendum constitutional amendments, in force and pending, significant statutes for carrying them into effect, six important judicial decisions, material relating to the State-wide Recall, and an analytical introduction by Professor Beard (of Columbia University).

The Initiative and Referendum.—Arguments pro and con by a Special Committee of the National Economic League, consisting of Robert L. Owen, William Allen White, Frederic C. Howe and Lewis J. Johnson, favoring; and George Sutherland, Emmet O'Neal, Frederick P. Fish and Charles F. A. Currier, opposing. National Economic League, 6 Beacon Street, Boston.

For a record of the progress of the movement, with able editorial comment, the reader is referred to *Equity*, a quarterly devoted wholly to the Initiative and Referendum and kindred topics. It is published by *Dr. C. F. Taylor*, 1520 *Chestnut Street, Philadelphia*, at fifty cents per year.

The National Popular Government League (Judson King, Secretary, 637 Munsey Building, Washington, D. C.) is the national organization for furthering the Initiative and Referendum.

CHAPPLE PUBLISHING COMPANY, BOSTON